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Libel 1980-85: Promises and Realities
Henry R. Kaufman*
I.

Introduction

Five years ago, a coalition of media organizations formed the
Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC) in recognition of the problematic turn that libel law had taken. Since its founding, LDRC has
both monitored and chronicled the vertiable flood of recent developments, many of which have been adverse to defendants, in the libel
field. Another active year for libel law is on the horizon. It is, therefore, an appropriate occasion to look back, and ahead, in order to put
some of these recent and forthcoming events into perspective.
Before we commence, a caveat is in order. What follows necessarily represents only a tentative and incomplete effort to comprehend recent developments. Few organizations have so systematically
monitored and conducted empirical studies of legal developments in
this specialized field as has the LDRC. Yet even LDRC's numerous
studies have only scratched the surface of a complete portrait of the
"real-world" scope of libel litigation in this country. On numerous
issues, much more remains to be learned before speculation and theorizing can be replaced with accurate and complete data.
That observation provides a useful transition into the underlying
theme of this analysis of recent trends. For what has fueled the debate over libel law during the past several years is a growing awareness of the substantial gap between the legal theory of libel, on the
one hand, and real-world litigation experience, on the other. To some
extent, this new awareness has been stimulated by the kinds of studies undertaken and data produced by LDRC. LDRC's work has begun to make clear that one may assess the efficacy of a particular
legal doctrine in the libel field only at the intersection of law and
* Mr. Kaufman is an attorney in New York City specializing in publishing and communications law. He is also General Counsel to the Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC). The
observations which follow are Mr. Kaufman's personal views. They should not be understood
as necessarily reflecting the views of the LDRC, or any of its supporting organizations. The
assistance of William A. Rome, a third-year student at the New York University Law School,
in the preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged. A somewhat shorter version of
this article was previously published in the Communications Lawyer, Vol. 3 No. 4, Fall 1985.

practice. When viewed in these terms, the now more than twentyyear-old promise of constitutional protection from the undue chilling
effects of libel claims remains decidedly unfulfilled.
New York Times v. Sullivan1 promised that by adopting substantive constitutional limits on libel actions brought on behalf of

public officials (and, later, public figures 2) "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open" expression would be protected. The Court also promised
that Sullivan would shield the press from "a succession of.

.

.judg-

ments" so large that they might either threaten a publisher's very
"survival," or else impose a "pall of fear and timidity . . .upon
those who would give voice to public criticism."' 3 Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,4 decided a decade after Sullivan, promised defendants
that state libel law would be rewritten to strengthen protection from
private libel plaintiffs' claims by at least precluding liability without
fault; and in all cases Gertz purported to reduce the practical impact
of libel claims in which plaintiffs successfully prove fault by raising
the standard for and limiting the categories of compensable
damages.

In reality, more than a generation after the adoption of Sullivan's lofty principals, the substantive limitations enunciated in Gertz
have not prevented even the highest of current or former public officials, or the most celebrated of public figures, from seeking millions

in damages against media defendants in libel actions. Moreover, in
the more than ten years since Gertz, its lesser constitutional protec-

tions have, if anything, been less effective in aiding the media's defense of libel actions brought by private plaintiffs.6 Neither Sullivan
nor Gertz has prevented juries from awarding a growing succession
of million and multi-million dollar damage awards. Indeed, today the
average, actual libel damage award approaches the total of awards
sought in the five related libel suits against The New York Times a
generation ago in Sullivan.6 Nor, finally, has any of the constituI. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974).
3. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278.
4. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
5. For example, Gertz simply left the states free to promulgate any liability standard
they chose as long as the standard required a finding of fault. While Gertz in theory would
have permitted states to adopt standards as demanding as Sullivan, or at least standards more
demanding than the minimal constitutional requirement, in fact, at last count only 5 states had
adopted standards greater than mere negligence; 27 had adopted the negligence standard; and
the remaining 22 had not clearly decided. See LDRC 50 State Survey 1984 as summarized in
LDRC Bulletin No. 13, March 31, 1985, at 9.
6. In the five related suits constituting the New York Times cases, damages in the
amount of $3,000,000 were sought. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278, n.18. According to LDRC data,
the average award for one recent period, involving eleven trials and eight jury awards, March
through July 1983, was actually in excess of $7,000,000! LDRC Bulletin No. 7, July 15, 1983,

tional defenses effectively limited the increasingly intolerable costs of
defending libel actions. These costs and burdens can "chill" free ex-

pression just as surely as any judgment actually imposed and
collected. 7

In a variety of areas, LDRC studies and data have highlighted
the growing gap between constitutional libel theory and reality at all
stages of libel litigation. Before claims are even filed, constitutional

protections should in theory serve as a deterrent to the commencement of libel litigation. There is growing evidence, however, that
self-restraint among potential libel plaintiffs, once perhaps the media's greatest protection in this field, has in reality all but evaporated. 8 Prior to trial, LDRC studies demonstrate that summary
judgment remains a crucial weapon in the media's arsenal. In reality, however, the increasing difficulties defendants have encountered
in enforcing constitutional protections at the pre-trial stage threatens
to emasculate this weapon.' At trial, the reality of frequent media
losses and staggering damage awards10 belies the theory of high barriers and heavy constitutional burdens. LDRC studies are beginning
to document how the theory of constitutional protection provides in-

adequate protection from real-world courtroom factors and jurors'
attitudes toward libel and the media." Even at the appellate level,
where media libel defendants generally continue to fare well, Sullivan's promise for meticulous and "independent" appellate review in

constitutional libel actions, reaffirmed only recently in Bose v. Consumers Union,12 could in practice be significantly undermined if the

D.C. Circuit reinstates'" its decision in Tavoulareas v. Washington
at 58. Overall, over the past four or five years, the average libel award has exceeded $2 million. LDRC Bulletin No. I1, November 15, 1984, at 14.
7. Despite widely publicized million dollar damage awards, it is clear that settlement
and defense costs - and not the payment of final judgments - remain the most serious
financial burdens of the current American libel system. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that
payment of defense costs by insurance companies represents as much as 80% of their payouts
to insureds. Massing, Libel Insurance: Scramblingfor Coverage, Jan-Feb 1986 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 36. Moreover, LDRC has found that although initial libel jury awards averaged
in excess of $2 million, the average of those few awards that were finally affirmed was, in the
most recent period, only $60,416. See LDRC Bulletin No. 11, supra note 6, at 23. This is not
to say, however, that huge initial awards do not have their effects on the libel system. It is
obvious that the threat of large awards, the costs of avoiding or appealing them, and the risk
that larger awards will ultimately be upheld, has raised the ante across the board in American
libel litigation, both in terms of the costs of defense and in terms of the value of settlements either the "nuisance value" of meritless claims, or the real value of claims with serious potential for liability, however infrequent they may be.
8. See infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
12. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
13. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.

Post.14
II.

Increasingly Litigious Libel Plaintiffs

Commentators have noted that during an extended period following Sullivan, relatively few public plaintiffs seriously contemplated libel litigation, fearing that pursuing such claims would inevitably be fruitless if not counterproductive. 5 Although it is now clear
that this self-restraint probably protected the media more than the
legal protections provided by Sullivan itself, it is apparent that the
era of self-restraint has come to an end. This change has led almost
certainly to either a greater number of claims actually filed, or at
least to a greater number of seriously pursued claims and, consequently, greater defense costs, or both.
The factors that have led to this increasing litigation are probably many. The seeming shift in the Supreme Court's attitude beginning with Gertz, while probably not as significant substantively as
psychologically, has apparently renewed hope in some potential libel
claimants. 6 The legal pendulum swing has paralleled an apparent
socio-political swing in public attitudes toward the media. 7 The tremendous publicity generated by recent libel trials - from Burnett v.
National Enquirer, Inc.'8 to Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc. 9 and
Sharon v. Time, Inc.2 0 - and the ultimately illusory, but nonetheless potent, lure of multi-million dollar damage awards have also encouraged libel plaintiffs.
14. 759 F.2d 90, rev'd, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985), (en banc) reh'g granted.
15. See generally Smolla, Let The Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1983) (theorizing on the forces behind a resurgence in
libel litigation only a decade after the law of defamation had appeared to be headed for
"obsolesence").
16. Some commentators have seen the recent drift of the Supreme Court as distinctively favoring libel plaintiffs and reflecting or portending major substantive changes by the
Supreme Court in the constitutional law of libel. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 15, at 50-63.
Others have concluded that whatever diminution may exist in the Supreme Court's first
amendment activism does not necessarily portend serious substantive retrenchment by the
Court in the libel field. See, e.g., Franklin, Five Years of Libel Cases at the Supreme Court
Door: A Look at the Quiet Side, LDRC 50 State Survey 1985-86: Current Developments in
Media Law and Invasion of Privacy Law (Foreword at XIV) (to be published Spring, 1986)
("[Although some see portents of retrenchment by the Supreme Court, I do not think that
major change is on the horizon - at least for the kinds of stories that media have traditionally
run. Nor do I see much likelihood of retreat from New York Times v. Sullivan.").
17. While it may well be an oversimplification, the observation that ten years ago the
journalists in the post-Watergate movie, "All the President's Men," wore the white hats and
were played by such stars as Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman, while less than ten years
later it was the media "victim" who was played by the star, Paul Newman, in the movie
"Absence of Malice," is not without some force in this regard.
18. 144 Cal. App.3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dism'd, 104 S. Ct. 1260
(1984).
19. 596 F. Supp. 1170, (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant
television station). This case was subsequently settled out of court. See infra note 24.
20. No. 83-4660, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1985).

Two other related phenomena have distinguished the reality of
recent libel litigation from the early promise of meaningful constraints under the first amendment. First, certain litigious groups
have come forward to prosecute or support libel claims. Whereas the
litigiousness of certain cult-like groups such as the Church of
Scientology 2 ' and Synanon22 has been known for some time, the
politicization of libel by non-cult organizations such as the Capitol
Legal Foundation in Westmoreland v. CBS is a relatively new phenomenon. The Sharon case also reportedly generated organized

funding, as has Senator Laxalt's pending suit against the Sacramento Bee.23 Perhaps the costly failure of General Westmoreland
and his supporters, manifested by the sudden settlement of the case,

will dissuade others from investing in the pursuit of such claims in
the future.24 However, the American Legal Foundation's recent formation of a Libel Prosecution Resource Center may indicate that
such groups will continue to pursue political ends through the device
25
of libel litigation.
Westmoreland, Sharon, Laxalt and like cases highlight the ultimate failure of the promise of Sullivan. The very public officials

whose libel claims Sullivan purported to preclude in all but the most
exceptional of circumstances, are increasingly using libel law against
their perceived critics in the media. LDRC recently completed a
comprehensive study of libel actions by public officials between 1979
and 1984; the results were then compared to data covering the pe-

riod 1976 to 1979 .6 Even taking into account the different time periods, the data gathered for that study indicate that both the number

and the frequency of libel actions by public officials have been increasing. Moreover, although a substantial portion of public official
libel actions during both periods involved lower level personnel, more
cases in the recent period involved highly-placed officials in significant policymaking and decisionmaking positions, including more fed21. LDRC Bulletin No. 2, November 15, 1981, at 28.
22. LDRC Bulletin No. 3, March 15, 1982, at 27.
23. Pursuant to Senate Resolution 508 and the "Regulations Governing Trust Funds to
Defray Legal Expenses Incurred by Members, Officers, and Employees of the United States
Senate," promulgated on Sept. 30, 1980 by the Select Committee on Ethics of the United
States Senate, Senator Laxalt was apparently required to establish a Legal Expense Trust
Fund associated with efforts to raise funds to defray costs related to his libel suit against the
Sacramento Bee. This Fund was established on Sept. 21, 1984 and in the Trustees' Interim
Report for the period Jan. 1, 1985 through June 20, 1985, 57 contributions were reported as
having been received, including monies from such well-known figures as Roger Milliken, Joseph Coors, Roy Cohn, Donald Trump, Ivan Boesky and numerous others. A more recent
report reveals that Senator Laxalt has raised in excess of $325,000 over the past year and a
quarter to support his libel suit. Recent contributors include former Secretary of State Alexander Haig and six United States Senators. See Editor & Publisher, April 5, 1986, at 14, 20.
24. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
25. See Washington Journalism Review, July 1985, at 12-14.
26. LDRC Bulletin No. 16, March 15, 1986, at 1.

eral officials, more foreign officials, more candidates for office, and
more judges. Again, whether this trend will continue after the unsuccessful conclusion of cases like Westmoreland and Sharon remains
to be seen.

III. Increased Pre-Trial Burdens and Costs
Recognizing that even the pendency of libel litigation can have
a chilling effect on the media, many lower courts prior to 1980 had
adopted special rules for early and relatively inexpensive disposition
of libel actions. In 1979, two decisions of the Supreme Court undermined the promise of those precedents and set in motion the continuing trend toward increased pre-trial burdens and costs. First, in Herbert v. Lando,27 the Court refused to adopt special rules to limit
discovery in libel actions, in particular regarding the editorial pro-

cess. There is little question but that Herbert has substantially increased the extent, duration, and cost -

siveness -

not to mention the intru-

of discovery in libel litigation."

Second, in a footnote in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,29 the Supreme

Court questioned the appropriateness of any special rules favoring
summary judgments, particularly in public plaintiff libel actions.
Since 1979 LDRC has undertaken two major studies to track the

effect of Hutchinson. In a study covering the first two years after
Hutchinson, LDRC found that summary judgment still appeared to
be "the rule rather than the exception" in libel litigation.3 ° Courts
granted seventy-five percent of the motions, a ratio consistent with
available data from the pre-Hutchinson period.3 1 Because Hutchinson's effects may not have been fully evidenced in the first two years
following the decision, LDRC undertook another two-year study of

summary judgment, covering the period 1982-1984.11 Again, courts
27. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, 596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), reh'g denied, 603 F. Supp. 983, (S.D.N.Y. 1985). On appeal the Second Circuit ruled
that summary judgment should have been granted as to all claims and dismissed the action, 12
(2d Cir. 1986).
F.2d Med. L. Rptr. 1593, 28. See Cendali, Of Things To Come - The Actual Impact of Herbert v. Lando and a
Proposed National Correction Statute, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 441, 465-72 (1985) (delineating
the "rising costs" of discovery resulting from Herbert and the attendant chilling effect on
investigative journalism).
29. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). In Hutchinson, the Court felt "constrained to express some
doubt" with respect to the notion that summary judgment was the appropriate stage for deciding defamation cases involving public figures/actual malice. Id. at 120, n.9. This well-known
footnote in Hutchinson was later elevated to text in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
30. LDRC Bulletin No. 4, Part 11, Oct. 15, 1982, at 2 (study of 110 summary judgment motions following Hutchinson from October 1980 through August 1982).
31. See Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. F. REs.
J., 795, 803 (Table 5) (finding a 78% summary judgment success rate for media defendants in
the period 1977-1980).
32. LDRC Bulletin No. 12, Dec. 31, 1984, at 1-37 (study of 136 motions for summary

granted almost three out of four motions. The defendants' success
rate in certain categories, however, had fallen somewhat. 3 Despite
these excellent statistical results, there remains some concern that

libel defendants are making fewer motions for summary judgment,
or that they are filing the motions only after conducting much more

costly discovery.
LDRC's summary judgment studies regarding the impact of
Hutchinson have also demonstrated that most courts, post-Hutchinson, have eschewed reliance on any special rule favoring summary
judgment. 4 While summary judgment is still frequently granted this
is so not because judges are widely applying special rules favoring

summary judgment, but because the cases under consideration either
completely lack merit on the undisputed facts or because, as a prac-

tical matter, it is apparent that the plaintiff could never meet the
high burden of proving constitutional malice by the "clear and convincing" standard required under Sullivan.5 Now, even this "neutral" application of summary judgment procedures is under scrutiny

by the Supreme Court in Liberty Lobby v. Anderson.36 While it is by
no means certain that the Supreme Court will go back on the promise of Sullivan in this regard, the continued ability of libel defendants to enforce constitutional protections at the pre-trial stage of libel litigation could be significantly affected should the Supreme

Court undermine application of the "clear and convincing" standard
on motions for summary judgment.
IV.

Problems at Trial
In theory the heavy constitutional burdens placed on libel plain-

tiffs should obviate the need for trials in most cases. Although the
judgment during that period).
33. With regard to the specific precedential effect of Hutchinson, federal courts considering summary judgment motions cited Hutchinson's footnote in only 6% of the cases in the
1982-1984 period and state courts in only 7% of the cases. This represented a substantial
decrease from the 1980-1982 study where federal judges were citing Hutchinson in 30% and
state judges in 12% of the summary judgment rulings. LDRC Bulletin No. 12, Dec. 31, 1984,
at 7.
34. Id. at 4, 19-37 (summarizing data that a majority of courts apply a "neutral" standard, rather than a "special" standard, in summary judgment motions made by media
defendants).
35. Id. at 6 ("clear and convincing" standard expressly noted and relied upon by courts
in connection with the grant of summary judgment in 28 cases of 136 analyzed).
36. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. granted,53 U.S.L.W. 3847 (June 7th, 1985)
(No. 84-1602) (argument heard December 3, 1985). In Anderson, and in conflict with precedent in other circuits, a panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Liberty Lobby's libel action against
Jack Anderson, holding that a plaintiff is not required to establish the existence of actual
malice with "convincing clarity" in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. Instead,
the panel decision held that the lesser standard of preponderance was sufficient at that stage.

lion's share of libel cases is still dismissed prior to trial,3 7 in reality
more libel cases are going to trial. And, at least at the trial court
level, media libel defendants fare far worse than the average civil

defendant in a tort action. LDRC's first major study of litigation
results at the trial level, covering libel trials involving media defendants in the period 1980-1982, documented jury verdicts against me-

dia defendants at the astounding rate of almost ninety percent.38
However high this rate may seem, other available data suggest that

the rate of pro-plaintiff libel verdicts, however high, was not significantly greater than the rate for the previous four years.3 9 A more
recent LDRC study for the years 1982-1984 has, for the first time,
shown a decline in trial losses for media libel defendants - just over
sixty percent."' Thus, media defendants in the 1982-1984 period reduced the jury loss rate by approximately thirty percent. Any enthusiasm, however, must be tempered. A sixty percent loss rate is obvi-

ously unacceptable

and still compares

unfavorably to other

comparable tort actions where defendants generally win sixty to seventy percent or more of their trials.4 1

Over the last year, LDRC has begun to explore the reasons for
these disturbing realities. It has now completed two in-depth juror
attitude case studies. 42 These studies, based on extensive interviews
37. In addition to disposition by summary judgment, LDRC studies have also documented the substantial success achieved by libel defendants on earlier motions to dismiss or on
demurrers. See LDRC Bulletin No. 8, September 30, 1983, at 1-60 (study of 95 motions to
dismiss during the period April 1981 to August 1983, finding that, when made, more than two
out of three motions to dismiss result in complete dismissal of the action in favor of the
defense).
38. In LDRC Bulletin No. 4, Part 1, October 15, 1982, LDRC data revealed plaintiffs
prevailed in 42 out of 47 (89%) cases submitted to juries during that period. In addition,
plaintiffs were only slightly less successful in bench trials during the same period, winning 5
out of 6 (83%). Id. at 5.
39. Prof. Mark Franklin's research survey entitled Winners and Losers and Why: A
Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. F. REs. J. 445, found that between 1976 and
1980 plaintiffs won at the trial level in 20 out of 24 cases before juries, a loss rate for defendants of 83%. Thus, for the combined period, 1976-1982, media defendants consistently lost
jury trials at a rate of nearly 90%. See LDRC Bulletin No. 4, supra note 38, at 5.
40. LDRC Bulletin No. 11, supra note 6, at 10.
41. For example, a 1982 study of 20 years of civil trials in Cook County, Illinois revealed that the rate of plaintiff's victories, in the aggregate was 51%. This percentage varied
significantly with the type of case, ranging from 33% in professional malpractice trials and
38% in product liability actions to 60% in business torts and contract cases. See Peterson and
Priest, The Civil Jury: Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County. Illinois, 1960-1979, FIC
Quarterly 361 (Summer 1982). The more relevant point of comparison for libel actions would
be medical malpractice and product liability claims, where any liability arises out of an afterthe-fact evaluation of allegedly faulty professional acts or products, rather than business or
contract actions, where the plaintiff and defendant have presumably previously agreed upon
express mutual obligations.
42. LDRC Bulletin No. 14, June 30, 1985 (Jury Study I) (newspaper defendant/public
official plaintiff); LDRC Bulletin No. 15, October 31, 1985 (Jury Study II) (broadcast defendant/private figure plaintiff). In LDRC Jury Study 1, seven out of twelve regular jurors and
both alternates were interviewed after a trial in which jurors had assessed damages approaching $1,000,000. The case is currently on appeal. In LDRC Jury Study 11, three out of six

with jurors who actually rendered the verdicts, explore juror attitudes toward those cases and assess how those attitudes translated
into verdicts against the media. Additional in-depth studies are
planned.
LDRC has also recently produced two videotapes that examine
jury attitudes in actual or hypothetical trials. One tape juxtaposes a
professional jury consultant's interviews of two CBS defense lawyers
with interviews of nine of the actual jurors in the Westmoreland
case. Working with its jury consultant and a law firm in San Francisco, LDRC also videotaped a full-scale simulated libel trial, based
on an actual case, presented to four groups of six jurors selected
demographically to represent a cross-section of the community. Each
of the four jurists was videotaped discussing variations of the case
and rendering their verdicts.
These LDRC studies and videotapes have already begun to generate a wealth of data on juror attitudes in libel and privacy cases.
Given the complexity of libel trials and the multitude of factors that
distinguish one case from another, ultimate generalizations must
await further studies. Nonetheless, some preliminary observations
can be made. The early LDRC empirical data on the results of jury
trials suggested to some that it was well nigh impossible for a defendant to win a libel trial before a jury. 3 The improved record at
the trial level over the last two or three years and the results of these
initial jury attitude studies clearly dispel that suggestion."" The recent trial results and LDRC's studies also appear to indicate that
juries are not inherently biased against the media in libel cases.
However, the recent evidence also shows that jurors are prepared to
hold the media to a very high standard of liability, despite the heavy
burden of proof imposed on libel plaintiffs by the first amendment.
And once jurors find liability, they are prepared to enter heavy dam45
age awards.
The LDRC jury studies also make clear that jurors are able to
comprehend the legal requirements of Sullivan and Gertz. But it is a
difficult undertaking to overcome a juror's natural inclination to impose a common-sense rule of "fairness" on media libel defendants. In
particular, jurors can understand the actual malice rule, but only if
carefully schooled. And even when the legal standards are well articulated by defense counsel, many jurors are often still inclined in
jurors and one alternative were interviewed after trial in which plaintiff had been awarded
$250,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
43. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text; see also LDRC Bulletin Nos. 14 and
15, supra note 42.

effect to nullify them, unless constrained by appropriately clear and
detailed legal instructions and by special verdict forms which specify
the long series of legal hurdles that must be overcome before liability
may be imposed."
Despite defense counsel's difficulties in educating jurors and the
already poor, though improving, statistical record compiled by the
media at trial in recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a case
this term that could potentially increase the burden on the defense
and possibly erode recent gains in the trial success rate of media
libel defendants. In Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers,4" the Su-

preme Court is considering whether the constitution requires that the
burden of proof of falsity be shifted to a private-figure libel plaintiff
and whether it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proof of
truth on the defendant as Pennsylvania law requires. If the Supreme
Court in Hepps declines to find burden of proof a matter of constitutional dimension, the states would be free to impose on a libel defendant the burden of proving truth, an often impossible task. To
place the burden on the defendant is contrary to the great weight of
authority in the lower courts, as documented in LDRC's annual 50State Survey of libel law developments" and would represent a
46. LDRC's videotaped interview of jurors in the Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc. case, see
text accompanying note 42 supra, provides a prime example of how effective defense counsel,
with ample time to communicate with the jury, and a trial judge willing to give the jury
careful and repeated interim instructions on the legal standards, can educate a jury to understand and abide by the otherwise confusing or counter-intuitive legal standards that are applicable in constitutional libel actions. It is reported that the jurors in another recently widelypublicized libel action, Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), were able to
understand and generally abide by an elaborate set of jury instructions and a detailed special
verdict form separating the elements of libel to be determined by a jury in such cases. See
N.Y. Times, January 31, 1985, at A23 col. 1. In Sharon the jury ruled in favor of Defense
Minister Sharon on the issues of falsity and defamatory meaning, but gave a verdict to Time
by finding an absence of "actual malice."
47. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374, cert. granted, 105
S. Ct. 3496 (1985) (No. 84-1491) (argued December 3, 1985). On April 21, 1986, before this
article went to press, the Supreme Court decided the Hepps case. In a 5 to 4 decision written
by Justice O'Connor (and joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Powell) the
Court held that the first amendment requires the burden of proof of falsity to be placed on the
libel plaintiff. This ruling would apply to both private plaintiffs and public, in any action
against a media defendant, at least so long as the subject of the allegedly libelous communication involves matter of "public concern." Although the limitation to matter of public concern
could create problems in certain kinds of cases, the Supreme Court's recognition that effectuation of "substantive" constitutional protections necessarily requires the constitutionalization of
special "procedural" mechanisms, such as burden of proof, is most welcome. The Court's desire to avoid a "chilling" effect "antithetical to the First Amendment," slip. op. at 10, also
holds out some hope for future developments in the field that will continue to be protective of
the rights of libel defendants. On the other hand, the fact that so narrow and fragile a majority supported the bedrock first amendment principle at stake in Hepps - i.e., proof of falsity
before liability may be imposed in a lible action - gives continuing cause for concern.
48. LDRC 50 State Survey 1984 at 879. As of Dec. 31, 1984 and counting the District
of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, 30 states placed the burden on the
plaintiff, 14 states on the defendant (including the challenged Pennsylvania statute in Hepps),
6 states had divided authority on the issue, 3 states had no authority, and Montana initially
placed the burden on the plaintiff, but permitted it to shift. It should be noted that the parties

troubling departure from basic constitutional libel theory; falsity has
long been considered an essential element of libel under the first
amendment.
V.

Uncontrolled Damage Awards

LDRC studies and continuing statistical updates have systematically monitored recent damage awards entered by juries in media
libel actions. The average award, in excess of $2 million over the
past four years, is grossly excessive. 49 In fact, some data suggest that
media libel defendants have been harder hit than defendants in medical malpractice and product liability cases, which are notorious for

high awards. 50 The recent LDRC jury attitude studies are only now
beginning to provide some insights into these damage awards. First
of all, jurors seek far more guidance than they typically receive from
the parties or the judge in identifying competent evidence on dam-

ages and in fixing an appropriate damage award. Although it is understandable that the defense would rather win their cases on liability, surely greater attention must be paid to damages issues. Most
important, the trial judge must clearly articulate meaningful legal
limits on damages. Without such guidance, the LDRC statistics and
initial jury studies clearly indicate that jurors - even if not predisposed against the media - will tend to impose huge awards. These
awards may be largely if not entirely unrelated to plaintiff's actual

damages, particularly if the defendant is a large corporation and the
jury is permitted to consider wealth as an issue."
in Hepps have not disputed that the burden as to truth or falsity in a public plaintiff libel
action must be on the plaintiff as a matter of constitutional mandate.
49. LDRC Bulletin No. I1, supra note 6, at 14. Of course, these excessive awards
rarely survive appeal, see supra note 7; infra note 59 and accompanying text.
50. According to Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Injury Valuation Reports, Current
Award Trends, No. 270 (Solon, Ohio, 1983), the average award in a product liability action
during the period 1980-1982 for 332 product liability awards was $785,651 and for 322 medical malpractice awards was $665,764. When the psychic nature of defamation injury is compared to the massive and permanent physical debilitation and lifelong expense that often accompany product liability and medical malpractice awards, only a desire to punish unpopular
parties or disfavored expression can explain this remarkable disparity between libel damage
awards and these other categories.
51. For example, in LDRC Jury Study 1, supra note 42, a case involving a major daily
newspaper, a number of jurors expressed serious doubts as to whether the plaintiff, a former
prosecutor who subsequently established a successful private practice, had suffered any economic injury from the alleged libel. Nonetheless, the jury's discussion of damages led off with
a suggestion of $2 or $3 million as an appropriate figure. While most of the jurors expressed
horror at the size of this amount, a relatively brief discussion led to the acceptance of a mathematical compromise verdict approaching $1 million. When one juror recalled the judge's instruction that the punitive and compensatory elements of any damage award must bear some
reasonable relationship to one another, the jury simply divided the lump-sum figure they had
already agreed upon roughly in half, 45% denominated as actual damages and 55% as punitive
damages. Id. at 8. In LDRC Jury Study I, supra note 42, a case involving a major television
defendant, the first suggestions of a relatively modest award of $10,000 or $50,000 were
quickly rejected as not sufficiently large to have an impact on the wealthy defendant's future

On this score as well, signals from the Supreme Court are
mixed. While the constitutionality of punitive damages technically
remains an open issue, last term the Court affirmed a six-figure punitive damage award in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss.52 The Court,
however, limited Greenmoss to its facts, holding that the particular
defendant was not entitled to protection under the first amendment.
Moreover, even Justice White's concurring opinion, which suggested
radical changes in substantive libel protections, recognized that additional limits might be placed on "recoverable damages" in libel actions through the removal of "the threat of large presumed and punitive damage awards.""3 It remains to be seen whether true reform on
the damages issues - clearly demanded by the current situation will be forthcoming in the trial courts, at the Supreme Court level,

or in a variety of proposed or pending legislative initiatives.54
VI.

Appellate Problems on the Horizon

All of these real-world litigation problems at the pre-trial and
trial stages can, in theory at least, find an ultimate cure at the appellate level. Indeed, the Sullivan court itself wisely recognized the
need for strong and "independent" appellate review in constitutional
libel actions as a means of assuring that constitutionally-guaranteed
rights were not violated in such actions.55 Happily, despite other adverse trends in the Supreme Court, that core principle was strongly
reaffirmed in Bose v. Consumers Union, just two terms ago. 56 LDRC
data clearly indicate the importance of the appellate process in libel
litigation, both as to liability issues and damages. LDRC's studies
have documented an almost seventy percent reversal rate in favor of
defendants on liability in libel actions since 1980. 57 When "indepenconduct, although the jurors did not express anger at the defendant. Figures as high as $5
million were mentioned before the round sum of $1 million in punitive damages was awarded.
In considering a compensatory award, the jurors interviewed did not appear to feel that the
plaintiff had proven significant financial injury. Nonetheless, because they had some sympathy
for the situation in which the plaintiff had been placed by defendant's broadcast, and in lieu of
any other concrete basis for calculating plaintiff's actual damages, the jury agreed upon a
compensatory award of $250,000, the amount the jury speculated plaintiff might have spent in
pursuing the litigation, although no evidence in this regard had been presented to the jury and
an award of attorney's fees presumably would not have been allowed. Id. at 14-15.
52. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
53. 105 S. Ct. at 2952.
54. For example, a pending federal "study bill" introduced by Congressman Charles E.
Schumer of New York would eliminate punitive damages altogether in public official or public
figure defamation actions. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985). While the likelihood of
federal legislation in this field must be questioned, the possibility of state legislative initiatives
focused on punitive damages is, in the author's view, realistic and appropriate.
55. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285.
56. Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
57. Out of 19 actions resolved from 1982-84, fewer than ',/ (6/19) of the awards were
affirmed on appeal. This was consistent with results from the 1980-1982 period in which out of
42 actions resolved, only 14 (33%) were affirmed. LDRC Bulletin No. 11, supra note 6, at 2.

dent" review was specifically applied, the reversal rate was even

higher, approaching eighty percent.5 8 Post-trial and appellate rulings
are also an indispensable tool in rejecting or reducing unreasonable
damage awards. Thus, although more than two dozen million-dollar
awards have been entered since 1980, not one has yet been finally
affirmed on appeal. The average affirmed award has actually decreased by half, to well under $100,000, during that same period. 59
But even these favorable appellate results, so necessary to ameliorate excesses at trial, remain under attack. The recent panel decision in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, now vacated pending rehearing en banc, would gravely undermine independent appellate
review of actual malice verdicts by according improper deference to

any factual findings arguably made in the trial court, and by unjustifiably expanding the cognizable elements of actual malice -

substi-

tuting sheer speculation, cynical inference, and circumstantial proof
of malice for actual, direct proof of knowing falsity.60 The Hepps

case also portends additional problems for appellate review in private-figure libel actions. 6 ' LDRC data already make clear that jurors may often leap easily from a finding of falsity to a finding of
negligence, which will escape meaningful review on appeal. 62 Accordingly, if Hepps were to shift the burden of proving truth to the
defense, and recognize the validity of a presumption of falsity, there
might be nothing left for an appellate court to review. In effect, pri58. LDRC Bulletin No. 7, supra note 6, at 2, 21 (independent appellate review study
undertaken by LDRC to determine whether Sullivan mandate was being followed revealed
nearly universal adherence by state and federal courts, as well as an 80% reversal or modification rate on appeal when an independent review standard was applied).
59. LDRC Bulletin No. I1, supra note 6, at 20-22. For the 1980-82 period the average
award affirmed was $119,456 compared to $60,416 for the 1982-84 period.
60. Tavoulareas, 759 F.2d 90, rev'd 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc) reh'g
granted, supra note 13. Judge Skelley Wright, in his dissent in Tavoulareas, described the
panel decision as:
no less than an ambitious, wide-ranging revision of libel jurisprudence . . . accomplish[ed] in two ways. First, it counts, as elements of actual malice, factors
that are completely impermissible considerations in reaching the daunting conclusion that the First Amendment does not apply to the challenged expression
....
Second, the majority dramatically narrows our well-established constitutional responsibility to conduct an independent review of the record in these
First Amendment cases. The nature of that review is critically important, and
the majority seeks to reduce it to a pro forma, mechanical ratification
759 F.2d 90, 145 (Wright, J., dissenting).
61. Hepps, 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374, cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 3496 (1985) (argued
Dec.3, 1985). But see note 47, supra, for a brief summary of the Supreme Court's recent
resolution of this issue in Hepps.
62. For instance, LDRC's data does not reveal a single case tried to a negligence standard in which a verdict or judgment for the plaintiff was reversed based exclusively upon an
appellate ruling that the finding of negligence was erroneous. LDRC Bulletin No. 6, March
15, 1983, at 42. See also LDRC Bulletin No. 12, supra note 32, at 7 (data indicating that
negligence standard provides little protection for media defendants at summary judgment
stage. A study of 136 summary judgment motions found that in none of those cases was summary judgment granted where negligence was the dispositive issue).

vate actions would revert to strict liability, once plaintiff proved a
defamatory publication by the defendant.
VII.

Conclusion

All of these realities of media libel litigation suggest that the
substantive constitutional protections adopted by Sullivan and Gertz
remain only promises today. In order to become fully effective, the
promised protections must be more sensitively and vigorously applied
using all of the tools, substantive and procedural, available to courts
and to communications lawyers. Unfortunately, the relationship between substance and procedure has been more clearly recognized by
the lower courts than by the current Supreme Court. Some Justices
have even suggested that developing procedural mechanisms to effectuate substantive protections is somehow improper "double counting." 63 In fact, LDRC data on the real-world operation of libel demonstrates that the suggested dichotomy between substance and
procedure is wholly illusory. Isolating substantive protections and
then permitting them to become progressively less effective for want
of a workable means of enforcement simply erodes the substantive
rules themselves. It remains to be seen whether the promises of Sullivan and Gertz will be thus undermined, or whether the realities of
current libel litigation will eventually be recognized, leading to a
more sensitive, careful, and consistent protection for the first amendment rights of media defendants and the entire public.

63. Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (rejecting a special constitutionally-based rule regarding personal jurisdiction in media libel actions, Justice Rehnquist wrote that "to reintroduce
[first amendment] concerns at the jurisdictional stage would be a form of double counting. We
have already declined in other contexts to grant special procedural protections to defendants in
libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws." id. (citations omitted)).

